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I
INTRODUCTION
The reemergence of a professional field of international criminal law at the
end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century—including
prominent institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)—has reshaped how atrocities
are handled at the international level. For the first time since International
Military Tribunals (IMTs) at Nuremberg and in the Far East, a legal and
normative logic of individual criminal accountability reemerged to respond to
1
massive human rights violations. This framework revived the legacy of
Nuremberg and Tokyo, which established modern legal claims of international
judicial and court authority. With legal authority delegated to ad hoc
international tribunals by the UN Security Council, and with the ICC acquiring
legal or de jure authority through treaty obligations or through the UN Security
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1. See generally JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE
HAGUE TRIBUNAL (2003); KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011); Ron Levi & John Hagan, Penser les
«crimes de guerre», 173 ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 6–27 (2008).
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Council, over the past three decades we have witnessed the expansion of an
institutional and professional field of “normative legalism” that, outside of the
European Court of Human Rights, enjoyed no authority—legal or otherwise—
2
during the Cold War.
Given the coercive nature of international criminal courts, and the
challenges they present to state sovereignty and sovereign immunity, we
identify the geopolitical context as crucial to delineating the scope of authority
3
that these courts enjoy. Indeed, the importance of geopolitical context is
evident in the very lead-up to the creation of this field of international criminal
4
law, because even achieving de jure authority has been contentious. And even
such courts’ de facto authority that resulted in sovereign legal accountability for
such crimes was developed in national settings for many years during the Cold
5
War before gaining significant political support on the international stage.
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, along with other specialized ad hoc courts and tribunals
from the 1990s forward, built on these approaches to emphasize human rights
6
enforcement through personal responsibility and punishment. By the time the
Rome Statute, which created the ICC, was adopted in 1998, the authority of
international criminal law had expanded and deepened through the landmark
practices of these earlier ad hoc tribunals and the political momentum that
supported their work. When one examines the narrow legal authority of these
post–World War II and post–Cold War Tribunals—the growth in their legal
mandate, the number of courts, the doctrinal expansion of the approach to
prosecuting war crimes from the 1990s forward, and the creation of a
permanent ICC in their wake—it is tempting to develop a teleological account
of the expansion in de jure (and de facto) authority in the field of international
7
criminal law. Yet a teleological account tends to downplay both fine-grained
questions that an analysis of de facto authority requires, and also the capacity to
gauge the authority of specific courts rather than of the wider field. This article
instead analyzes two broad elements: First, the contextual factors that shape the
authority of international courts, in particular the constituencies they can

2. See generally GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000).
3. See Mikael Rask Madsen, Explaining the Power of International Courts in Their Contexts:
From Legitimacy to Legitimization, in COURTS, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 23,
23–24 (Adriana Silvia Dreyzin de Klor et al. eds., 2012).
4. See SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 5.
5. Id.
6. See generally John Hagan & Ron Levi, International Police, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE:
THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 207 (Markus D. Dubber &
Mariana Valverde eds., 2006); Jane Jenson & Ron Levi, Narratives and Regimes of Social and Human
Rights: The Jack Pines of the Neoliberal Era, in SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA 69
(Peter A. Hall & Michèle Lamont eds., 2013); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, From the Cold War to
Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
231 (2006).
7. See SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 14–18; Levi & Hagan, supra note 1, at 6–10.
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mobilize, the geopolitical context in which they operate, and their relations with
national fields of power; and second, connected to these, the international legal
8
practices that these courts and their actors develop. It is this dual approach to
understanding authority—the articulation between practices and contextual
factors, with court practices continuously adapting to external contexts—that
9
we operationalize through the study of international criminal courts.
International criminal courts uniquely draw together these two indicators of
authority, with external contextual factors deeply connected to the internal
legal practices that these courts go on to develop. This is because international
criminal courts operate in what criminal justice scholars identify as “atypical
political environments,” or highly contentious environments in which
surrounding political conditions lead to a departure from routinized criminal
justice, so that courts must develop organizational models to cope with,
10
mobilize, and at times deflect, the political landscape in which they operate.
In international criminal courts, such atypical political environments are the
norm rather than the exception. For instance, during ongoing conflicts or when
dealing with uncooperative states, international criminal courts face unique
constraints on their authority—including both the absence of police or arrest
authority and limitations on searches and seizure opportunities—requiring
11
prosecutors to develop new evidentiary approaches. Similarly, national
governments, their leaders, and their allies often contest the very idea of
international criminal prosecutions, so that with every move to build authority
these courts can find themselves losing, rather than gaining, adherents and
12
potential legal cases. So, in atypical environments, some of the usual strategies
courts could develop to gain wider authority are often unavailable.
Precisely because of these contextual features, we turn to prosecutorial
strategies as a salient practice for assessing the authority of international
criminal courts. Prosecutorial practices are not the only factor relevant to an
international criminal court’s authority; but, in these environments, it is the
decision to investigate, to prosecute, and to adduce evidence that is the most
noticed and dramatic feature of their work, and that is central to their capacity
to garner, retain, and expand its audiences and support. This article thus focuses
on prosecutorial practices rather than the increases in case volume or the
changes in enforcement mechanisms that other international courts use to build
8. See generally Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes
the Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 17, 32; Jens
Meierhenrich, The Practice Of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., nos. 3 & 4, 2014, at 1.
9. See, e.g., DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A
WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 57 (2014); Heather Schoenfeld, Ron Levi & John Hagan, Crises extrêmes
et institutionnalisation du droit pénal international, 36 CRITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 37 (2007).
10. See generally John Hagan, Why Is There So Little Criminal Justice Theory? Neglected Macroand Micro-Level Links Between Organization and Power, 26 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 117 (1989).
11. See Ron Levi & Heather Schoenfeld, Médiation et droit pénal international, 174 ACTES DE LA
RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 4, 6–9 (2008).
12. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014).
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constituencies. These strategies work to enhance the authority of international
criminal courts in the face of built-in challenges by aligning or deflecting
geopolitical factors and constituencies. In other words, prosecutorial practices
link the internal bureaucratic organization of these courts to their geopolitical
contexts, and the authority of international criminal justice is augmented or
constrained through choices that prosecutors develop and through the
constituencies to which the prosecutors are oriented in employing these
13
practices.
II
INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY IN ATYPICAL POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENTS: PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY AND EVIDENCE
This article thus emphasizes links between prosecutorial strategy, legal
evidence, and methods of case development that are crucial for constructing the
authority of international criminal courts. Indeed, once one looks beyond the
14
“high politics” question of jurisdiction—which, in the case of these courts, is
what implicates their capacity to operate and gain custody over situations and
individuals—one quickly recognizes that the question of evidence, its
production, and its use in court represent the sort of practices that Alter, Helfer,
and Madsen identify as international “legal practices” through which officials
15
build authority.
Whereas in many courts international legal practices are linked to how
international judges build authority, in the case of international criminal courts
the key location for these practices lies upstream in the process, in the office of
the prosecutor. Economic and human rights courts are often dependent on the
facts and arguments adduced by external litigants; however, in international
criminal prosecutions, the in-house indictment and the presentation of evidence
produce alliances with external constituencies, and the authority that
international criminal justice garners is augmented or constrained by the scope
of the network these courts can build. Similarly, indictments and the
presentation of evidence are central for building court authority rather than
pursuing other international alternatives. Indeed, gaining any toehold is a
challenge because salient actors are more likely to snub the prosecutor’s
indictment or to comply with evidentiary demands than to rebuff a final
judgment (prominently seen in the snubbing of the ICC by Sudanese President
16
Al-Bashir). Finally, given that international criminal prosecutions are timeand-space bound, these environments might risk producing, at least
13. Due to space constraints, this article does not systematically address the constituencies to
which international prosecutors speak beyond that which is drawn out through an analysis of
prosecutorial practices themselves.
14. NIILO KAUPPI, DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL RESOURCES AND POLITICAL POWER IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2005).
15. See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 5.
16. See ADAM BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS: WAR AND INTERVENTION IN
NORTHERN UGANDA 179 (2011).
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17

domestically, one-shotters rather than repeat players. It is thus a challenge to
build relationships of trust with civil society organizations, lawyers, diplomats,
or other constituencies that would normally allow for growth in narrow and
18
intermediate authority over time.
In other words, in these atypical political environments, court authority
turns on the capacity of prosecutors, rather than judges, to collect and garner
evidence of atrocities to be translated into the criminal process. They must
organize their evidence and strategy in “loosely coupled” or “tightly coupled”
19
ways with external actors, such as victims or experts. In contrast to economic
cases, establishing this evidence is the concern of institutional insiders—
prosecutors—and thus these operational “low politics” of evidence collection
and presentation are a salient policy concern. For example, a recent article in
The New York Times focused on the challenges faced by “an extraordinary
20
witness” of the ICTY. Reflecting on her case, an ICTY staff member noted:
21
“Without witnesses, without key insiders, there are basically no trials.” And
just a few months earlier, a piece in The Guardian, noted the challenges of
working with witnesses for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder, including “huge amounts of
testimony and paperwork [that] were generated,” and a prosecutor’s comment
that “[l]ots of money got spent feeling our way forward. It costs a lot to fly in
22
witnesses from around the world.”
This article thus links these organizational practices of evidence collection
23
with the geopolitical context in which these courts operate. At Nuremberg, a
political decision was reached to focus the prosecution on a small number of
Nazi figures, with particular attention paid to the documenting of atrocities by
the prosecution rather than on developing a doctrinal base of judicial decisions.
This aligned the prosecution with a U.S.-based legal constituency and helped
deflect the critique of a Tribunal merely furthering victor’s justice—a claim that
24
bedeviled the “united nations” leading the prosecution at Nuremberg. The
ICTY emerged in a context of political and professional alignments, particularly
with the growth of the human rights community, to expand a framework for
25
legal accountability in times of conflict. This contributed to the opportunity to
17. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–114 (1974).
18. See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 4.
19. See Hagan, supra note 10, at 117–20.
20. Marlise Simons, Witness in War Crimes Court Tallies Cost of a Decade in Hiding: Testifying
Against Slobodan Milosevic at Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2014, at A5.
21. Id.
22. Owen Bowcott, Rwanda Genocide: The Fight to Bring the Perpetrators to Justice, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/rwanda-genocide-fightjustice.
23. See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 26–27; Hagan, supra note 10, at 130.
24. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 27 (1998).
25. See generally HAGAN, supra note 1.
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produce significant jurisprudence, based largely on the prosecutorial framing of
26
these crimes rather than the reasoning of the final judgments. Despite the
financial, moral, and political support of Western governments, civil society
organizations, domestic political constituencies seeking economic benefits for
reconstruction, and the international human rights community rallying behind
the extension of human rights into the complexities of war and conflict, ICTY
prosecutors still needed to gain narrow and intermediate authority by enrolling
27
compliance partners with which to do their work. They thus responded to this
authority deficit in strategic fashion over time by leveraging the extensive
authority they enjoyed to secure defendants and evidence that would expand
the Tribunal’s caseload, to ascertain the collaboration of media partners to
build constituencies, and to later develop a strategy to coordinate with national
court prosecutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Compare the ICTY to the treaty-based ICC, which was negotiated during
the momentum that grew around the ICTY and the project of international
legalism. But despite this momentum, the ICC became operational in the post9/11 climate, a disjuncture that affected its capacity to deliver on original
28
hopes. Attempts to grow its caseload volume generated resistance to its
jurisdiction and the withdrawal of voluntary state parties. Indeed, the authority
of the ICC is at stake in the potential withdrawal of African Union states from
the ICC, with the African Union expressing concern over the “politicization
29
and the misuse of indictments against African leaders by the ICC,” and a
30
continued call to “speak with one voice” regarding these prosecutions. It is
perhaps not surprising that its first prosecutor has insisted that the measure of
the Court’s success should not be its judgments, but a combination of
deterrence and local legal accountability that could drive the Court’s caseload
to zero. The ICC’s early prosecutions to date have thus targeted a small number
of high profile cases.
31
In these three courts, once one looks beyond the “high politics” of the
field’s relationship to peacemaking and diplomacy, court authority relies to a
significant degree on, and is reflected in, prosecutors’ practices. Prosecutors
choose their evidentiary strategies based on the geopolitical context at hand and
work to enhance court authority by identifying evidentiary strategies that align
26. See Kelly Askin, Analysis: Foca’s Monumental Jurisprudence, Tribunal Update 226 (June 18–
23, 2001), https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=JUSTWATCH-L;c4188521.0106.
27. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996).
28. BOSCO, supra note 9, at 72–76.
29. Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, AFRICAN
UNION 1 (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Ext_Assembly_AU_Dec_Decl_ 12Oct2013
.pdf.
30. Press Release, African Union Assembly, 22nd Ordinary Session of the African Union
Assembly Concludes: A Summary of Key Decisions (Jan. 31, 2014), http://summits.au.int/en/
22ndsummit/events/22nd-ordinary-session-african-union-assembly-concludes-summary-key-decisions-0.
31. KAUPPI, supra note 14, at passim.
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the prosecutors with important external constituencies. By analogizing to
atypical domestic trials, we identify that the success or failure to build
international legal authority in these settings is conditioned by the different
political, legal, and organizational arrangements in which international courts
32
operate. Turning to three main cases—Nuremberg, the ICTY, and the ICC—
this article examines how these prosecutors build authority differently across
geopolitical contexts.
III
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG
In his opening statement to the Nuremberg trials in 1945, the Chief
Prosecutor for the United States, Justice Robert Jackson, stressed the
33
importance of documentary proof in the prosecution. “We will give you
undeniable proofs of incredible events,” he said, referring among other items to
“hundreds of tons of official German documents,” the “captured orders and
captured reports” that provide evidence of atrocities, and the violence and
34
criminal enterprise that “we will prove from their own documents.” This
attention to documents became the leitmotif of the prosecution, and with it a
reflection on the machinery of Nazi Germany itself: “There is no count in the
Indictment that cannot be proved by books and records,” Jackson indicated,
35
emphasizing that “[t]he Germans were meticulous record keepers.” And
indeed this was Jackson’s position for months leading up to the prosecution, in
which he stressed the record of the IMT and its need to be perceived as
36
authoritative.
In one of his best-known statements at the International
Conference leading to the trials, Jackson insisted, “We must establish incredible
events by credible evidence,” stating that the trial would be “a drab case” based
on documentary evidence of Nazi crimes, but that the documents would render
37
it unchallengeable.

32. See generally Hagan, supra note 10.
33. See Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal (Nov.
21, 1945), http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-hjackson/opening-statement-before-the-international-military-tribunal/.
34. Id.
35. Id. This lies in contrast to the later Tokyo trial that relied substantially on affidavits from
prisoners of war. See TIM MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 57–58
(2001).
36. See DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE FORMATION
OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY 60–69 (2001); CHRISTIAN DELAGE, CAUGHT ON CAMERA:
FILM IN THE COURTROOM FROM THE NUREMBERG TRIALS TO THE TRIALS OF THE KHMER ROUGE
63–82 (2013); LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN
THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 41–53, 114 (2001); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 43–55 (1993); Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the
Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 4, 1559–98 (2006).
37. Stephen Breyer, Crimes Against Humanity: Nuremberg 1946, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162
(1996).
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The document-based tone of Nuremberg permeated the courtroom. As
observed in The New Yorker, the trials were frightfully dull—so much so that
the lawyers and staff “want[ed] to leave Nuremberg as urgently as a dental
38
patient enduring the drill wants to get up and leave the chair.” Similarly,
Joseph Kessel wrote that the Nuremberg trial’s emphasis on documents did not
allow for any “breath of life,” with the most animated discussions focusing on
39
the numbering of files and exhibits.
Legal and historical analysts of the Nuremberg tribunal have understood the
decision to rely on documentary evidence as driven by the sheer availability of
documents of Nazi crimes and atrocities. Yet the extent of the Nuremberg
Court’s authority at that time demonstrates that the documentary reliance was
also a prosecutorial practice tied to both the geopolitical context and the
specific support that the prosecution enjoyed with external constituencies. The
authority the Nuremberg prosecution strove to develop thereby relied on
preexisting U.S.-based legal practices, so as to build extensive authority among
a U.S.-based community of lawyers, and to help overcome some of the broader
skepticism over the trials.
In their analysis of how international courts expand their authority over
time, Alter, Helfer, and Madsen emphasize that recently established courts
draw upon preexisting international legal practices from other domains,
whereas older international courts are often forced to invent new practices in
40
their area. This article suggests that in the case of the IMT at Nuremberg,
building a constituency at home (and a professional constituency that would
support the prosecution from within the Tribunal as well) was achieved by
drawing on preexisting national legal practices from other domains—in this case
prominent antitrust cases in the United States. At an early stage in this field’s
development, this strategy positioned the tribunal well with respect to the
powerful constituency of legal elites in the United States with whom it was in
dialogue, and for many of the institutional insiders at Nuremberg represented
the professional community to which they belonged.
To understand the prosecutorial strategy of the IMT one must contend with
the overwhelming early suspicion—both in the United States and the United
Kingdom, and certainly in the former Soviet Union—surrounding the idea of
criminal prosecution of Nazi leaders, regarded by many as risky and viewed by
some elites and the public as an overly soft response. This was instantiated in
the view of Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who
41
derided the strategy as “kindness and Christianity” rather than a strategy to

38.
34, 35.
39.
(2007).
40.
41.

Rebecca West, A Reporter at Large: Extraordinary Exile, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 1946, at
JOSEPH KESSEL, JUGEMENTS DERNIERS: LES PROCES PETAIN, NUREMBERG ET EICHMAN
See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 26.
BASS, supra note 2, at 162.
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42

deindustrialize Germany and to “attack[] the German mind” itself. The IMT’s
comparative lack of early authority was reflected in the views of elite
government lawyers such as Joseph O’Connell, who regarded the Tribunal as a
fundamentally “unlegalistic approach” that applies domestic approaches “to a
43
world situation which has nothing in common with it.” It was similarly
reflected in the early views of President Roosevelt, who sought to emphasize
the collective responsibility of the German people, rather than merely that of “a
44
few Nazi leaders.” Second, among other segments there was criticism over the
tribunal’s perceived legitimacy, with the trials often derided as “victor’s justice,”
and the criminal counts enumerated in the Charter of the IMT characterized as
45
ex post facto charges that undercut legal and political legitimacy. Even Judith
Shklar, who produced the classic defense of the liberalism of Nuremberg,
46
concluded that “little can be said on behalf of the legality of the Trial,” with
47
some leading legal figures of the time expressing concern over this very point.
And third, the prosecution was internally embattled: each of the Allies were
pursuing different goals, and each articulated the rationale for the prosecution
differently depending on the degree to which they regarded themselves as
48
victims of the Nazi regime.
A strategy of identifying a small number of Nazi leaders for prosecution at
trial won out over competing views that emphasized summary executions of
49
leaders or a broad collective punishment of Germans. The documentary
approach undergirding this newly adopted strategy was based on a U.S. legal
strategy developed for domestic purposes in the antitrust litigation of the New
Deal. This was combined with the decision to prosecute leading Nazi figures not
for the atrocities of the Holocaust, but for the crime of aggressive war—a crime
which turned on a reading of international legal obligations deriving from the
50
Kellogg–Briand Pact of the interwar years. While the prosecution would
include war crimes and a newly created “crime against humanity,” even these
charges were cabined—by the prosecutors and the Tribunal’s judges—to
51
atrocities that could be tied to aggressive war.

42. Id. at 152.
43. Id. at 179.
44. Id. at 154.
45. See MINOW, supra note 24, at 27; cf. Susanne Karstedt, The Nuremberg Tribunal and German
Society: International Justice and Local Judgment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, in THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG: CIVILISING INFLUENCE OR INSTITUTIONALISED VENGEANCE? 13 (David A.
Blumenthal & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 2008) (discussing the influence of the Nuremberg Trials
in Germany).
46. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 168 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Max Radin, Justice at Nuremberg, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 369 (1946).
48. See BASS, supra note 2, at 147.
49. Id.
50. See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBURG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945–46: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 229–30 (1997).
51. See DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 48–53.
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Jackson’s prosecutorial strategy was deeply rooted and mirrored in the
experience of his leadership team. This, in turn, was mirrored in the personnel
who were drawn to the Court. Most of the prosecutorial team had no
international legal capital, and its members were often young and
comparatively inexperienced. Indeed, the jurisconsultes of the UN War Crimes
Commission, who might have brought international expertise to the case, were
52
reluctant to join the Nuremberg prosecution. Yet if junior staff filled the
prosecutorial ranks, the most senior of the U.S. lawyers at Nuremberg were
those who had been instrumental in U.S. antitrust cases. Robert Jackson played
53
a leading role in such cases throughout the 1930s, and he was joined at
Nuremberg by other prominent New Deal veterans of antitrust litigation:
William Donovan of the OSS; John Amen of the U.S. Attorney General’s
Office, who was New York’s “leading ‘crime buster’” and son-in-law of
54
President Cleveland; and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War and the leading
proponent in the Roosevelt Administration for holding war crimes trials. These
lawyers had all invested in antitrust litigation strategies for criminal
prosecutions domestically, whether dealing with corporations such as the Sugar
55
Trust or with gangsters in New York. The Sugar Trust prosecution notably
built a “joint criminal enterprise” approach that was the foundation for the
56
Nuremberg trials. The strategy displayed positions in the Nazi leadership
regime and an analysis of the Nazi organizational structure—with documentary
records providing the material needed to establish the IMT’s authority over the
57
case.
Taking this shared domestic legal experience to the international stage—and
to a tribunal that was considered to be without precedent—was a prosecutorial
strategy designed to resonate with the existing practices of a powerful legal
expert constituency within the United States. Indeed, the leading U.S.
government designer and champion of the trial-based approach at Nuremberg,
Henry Stimson took the view that this prosecutorial practice would resolve the

52. See Guillaume Mouralis, Lawyers versus Jurisconsults: Sociography of the Main Nuremberg
Trial, in JUSTICE IN WARTIME AND REVOLUTIONS: EUROPE, 1795–1950, at 315–326, 317 (Margo de
Koster et al. eds., 2012).
53. See Richard Overy, The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making, in FROM
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 6 (Philippe
Sands ed., 2003); William Kolasky, Robert H. Jackson: How a “Country Lawyer” Converted Franklin
Roosevelt into a Trustbuster, 27 ANTITRUST 85 (2013).
54. See SANDRA QUINN-MUSGROVE & SANFORD KANTER, AMERICA’S ROYALTY: ALL THE
PRESIDENTS’ CHILDREN 134–35 (1995); ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 70
(1986).
55. See BASS, supra note 2, at 148, 171; QUINN-MUSGROVE & KANTER, supra note 54, at 134–35;
KIRSTEN SELLARS, ‘CRIMES AGAINST PEACE’ AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Kim Christian
Priemel, “A Story of Betrayal”: Conceptualizing Variants of Capitalism in the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials, 1 J. MOD. HIST. 85, 69–108 (2013).
56. See Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J.
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 169–72 (2007).
57. See BLOXHAM, supra note 36, at 60–62; MARRUS, supra note 50, at 40–43.
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58

“difficult question” of the Nuremberg trials. Relying on documents and
adopting an antitrust-type format, Stimson followed a prosecution strategy “in a
way which is at the same time consistent with our traditional judicial principles
and also will be effective in dispensing adequate punishment and also will leave
a permanent record in the shape of the evidence collected of the evils against
59
which we have fought this war.” In other words, Stimson not only agreed with
Jackson’s documentary-based prosecutorial strategy, but he identified it as a
way to square the circle of ongoing, potential authority challenges the Tribunal
was facing.
Veteran New Deal lawyers were convinced that such a format would
resonate with a community of adherents in the United States, while also
providing an opportunity for the IMT to build an authoritative narrative about
the war. The Assistant Secretary of War and Wall Street Lawyer John McCloy
went so far as to enthusiastically assure Secretary of Treasury Henry
Morgenthau that “[a]fter Justice Jackson puts the Gestapo on the stand and has
indicted them like the American Sugar Company or whatever it was, then he
60
says ‘By God, you’re guilty.’” This emphasis was perhaps seen otherwise by
Sidney Kaplan, a member of the prosecutorial team at Nuremberg, who wrote
the day before the trial began, “[T]he prosecution is utterly, completely,
hopelessly, unprepared. Jackson will deliver a sensational opening statement—
61
and from that point on we’re in the soup.” As historian Gary Bass concludes,
62
Nuremberg was mainly U.S.-created and led, with the allies following suit.
Procedures would reflect the work of keeping agreement across countries, such
as the lengthy indictment that would recite details in a manner uncommon for a
63
U.S. prosecution. Beyond the national legal constituency from which Jackson
and many leaders on the team emerged, the IMT prosecution also sought to
build authority for the Nuremberg trials by looking to the future and the
anticipated legacy of the trial. Jackson sought to do so by building an external
constituency for the Tribunal by emphasizing the historical momentum it could
spur. In so doing, Jackson privileged documentary evidence and actively sought
64
to limit testimony as much as possible. As he wrote to Stimson, Jackson
perceived this evidentiary basis as “the sounder foundation for the case,
65
particularly when the record is examined by the historian.”
For this strategy to succeed, Jackson required documentation. Europe was
in a ravaged state, and there were an enormous number of documents to
58. BASS, supra note 2, at 171–72.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 171.
61. John Q. Barrett, The Nuremberg Roles of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 511, 512–13 (2007).
62. See BASS, supra note 2, at 150, 182, 196; see also Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in
Developing an International Legal System, 22 TEMP. L. Q. 147, 154 (1948) [hereinafter Some Problems].
63. See Some Problems, supra note 62, at 151.
64. See DOUGLAS, supra note 36, at 16–17.
65. BLOXHAM, supra note 36, at 61.
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locate. Jackson reached out to gain the cooperation of the secretive Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor organization of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and its Director General William Joseph Donovan.
Donovan and the OSS had been keeping files on potential Nazi war criminals
for years and had a collection of intelligence materials from OSS secret agents
67
who operated within the Nazi hierarchy and resistance networks. The OSS had
a long-standing presentation branch that specialized in presenting complex
68
matters by bringing together charts, film, or photography. The OSS also had
69
personnel fluent in German and with deep knowledge of German society.
Yet the OSS would also critique this document-based strategy. Leading
officials in the OSS, including Donovan, maintained that Jackson should rely on
70
witness testimony to draw in the mainstream media and depict atrocities. This
article ventures that this difference in trial strategy was not only tactical, but
was also about the very goals of the Tribunal itself, its capacity to attract
adherents, and the audience to which Donovan himself was oriented. For
71
Donovan, Nuremberg “was a lawsuit plus something else.” In contrast to
building authority with historians or for posterity, Donovan was most sensitive
to the short-term political impact of the trial in Germany and its opportunity to
72
set a foundation for de-Nazification policies. Therefore, while proponents of
documentary evidence focused on enhancing the Tribunal’s legal authority,
Donovan was interested in the trial’s immediate political effects on post-war
Germany.
Jackson’s strategies for achieving authority for the Tribunal led him to reject
most of Donovan’s suggestions regarding witness testimony. Jackson was
reticent to include testimony from victims or from defendants: victims could be
subject to attacks on their credibility, and defendants testifying could give the
73
impression that a plea bargain had taken place. Witness testimony was
regarded as an “unnecessary cumulation of evidence,” and importantly for the
Court’s capacity to build its authority through its prosecutorial practices,
witnesses would—in Jackson’s view—run the risk of demonstrating “a strong
74
bias against the Hitler regime.” He even rejected the views of some on his
team who suggested that the case gain “added authority” by having atrocities
66. See generally Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials: An Appraisal, 23 PROC.
ACAD. POL. SCI. 19 (1949).
67. See MICHAEL SALTER, NAZI WAR CRIMES: US INTELLIGENCE AND SELECTIVE
PROSECUTION AT NUREMBERG 346–51 (2007).
68. See generally Dan Kiley, Architect of Palace of Justice Renovations, in WITNESSES TO
NUREMBERG: AN ORAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 15
(Bruce M. Stave, Michele Palmer & Leslie Frank eds., 1998).
69. See Mouralis, supra note 52.
70. See BLOXHAM, supra note 36, at 60–61; JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON
TRIAL 26 (1995).
71. See TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 185.
72. See id. at 183–85; SALTER, supra note 67, at 320.
73. See TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 184.
74. BLOXHAM, supra note 36, at 61.
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presented by “a group of high churchmen” who could speak to Nazi atrocities—
in favor of a strategy that would control the evidence in a measured and
75
76
systematic way. Although he relented a little with time, Jackson stated that
77
the prosecution would “put on no witnesses we could reasonably avoid.”
The evidentiary approach of the IMT at Nuremberg demonstrates the close
connection between legal practices and geopolitical context that is critical to
international court authority. This was a highly atypical political environment:
the Allies had occupied Germany, the Nazi regime had extensively documented
its crimes, and the leading defendants were captured and in the dock. The
Tribunal itself, in this environment, was perceived as exceptional and the object
of widespread skepticism among European and American constituencies. The
decision to rely nearly exclusively on documentary evidence, and to resist
witness testimony—at the expense of not only media attention, but also
immediate political outcomes in post-war Germany, the chance to build such
media as a platform for victims of Nazi Germany to speak out, and even a
78
potentially reduced emphasis on some atrocities —can partly be explained as
an effort to build authority for the Tribunal and the legalistic approach it
pursued.
Nuremburg’s prosecutorial practices shed light on an important and
potentially generalizable lesson for the study of international court authority.
Nuremberg was a new, time-limited court for which narrow and intermediate
authority was not an issue, due to the occupation of Germany by the Allies and
the availability of incriminating documents. Yet building extensive authority
was another matter. With the United States occupying a dominant position
among the Allies in the post-war period, the Tribunal’s prosecution sought to
produce this extensive authority by relying on a well-known and highly
regarded domestic legal strategy, as Stimson noted, to resolve the “difficult
79
question” of the Nuremberg trials. Antitrust lawyers with close ties to the state
came to dominate at the Tribunal with this move. Thus, Jackson’s documentary
strategy appears to have bolstered the IMT’s authority within the community of
elite U.S. lawyers whose work on antitrust cases defined their practices with a
prosecutorial approach that built in this extensive authority and that deflected
potential resistance from the start.
IV
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The Cold War soon made it politically unfeasible to develop international
legal or political responses to war crimes, a geopolitical conjuncture that led to
waning professional momentum for international war crimes prosecutions in
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 67.
SALTER, supra note 67, at 409–10.
BLOXHAM, supra note 36, at 202.
BASS, supra note 2, at 171–72.
Id.
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80

both Europe and the United States. With the end of the Cold War, however,
two influential institutions emerged. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was established in 1995 to investigate human rights
abuses that occurred under the apartheid regime, and underwritten by an
argument that overtly positioned itself in distinction to that of Nuremberg and
81
of trials. Established in 1992 by the UN Security Council, the ICTY was the
first international war crimes tribunal in the post–Cold War era. This turn to
law was partly fuelled by political expediency, and as Samantha Power notes, it
“seemed a low-cost, low-risk way for Western states to signal that despite their
opposition to military intervention, they were not indifferent to Bosnia’s
82
suffering.”
Basic legal authority (or jurisdiction) was explicitly delegated to the ICTY
by Security Council Resolution. Indeed, there was significant appetite and
support for a legal framework to respond to atrocities committed in war. This
included political support from powerful states and in particular the Clinton
Administration, which provided the ICTY with resources, expertise, and
83
political support. This was further supplemented by the expansion of an
84
internationalized field of human rights and the growing influence of human
rights organizations that had gained in technical proficiency, professional savvy,
and political autonomy over the 1980s. This growing influence included
extending to the law of armed conflict—as well as the media savvy of human
rights and feminist organizations to raise awareness of the atrocities being
85
committed. Emerging in the early 1990s, the ICTY found itself in a context
with a political and professional appetite for articulating the link between
human rights and armed conflict.
Yet even with this Security Council delegation, and buoyed by significant
political, professional, and social movement support that translated to extensive
authority for its work, the ICTY initially found itself in a precarious position
respecting its intermediate authority, namely its capacity to attract compliance
86
partners. The Court even felt constraints on its narrow authority; it had no
indictees to prosecute or tools to do its work. The ICTY’s position as a “virtual
tribunal” defined the strategies that its prosecutors could develop. Though
states are formally required to cooperate with its investigations, as a practical
matter, the access of Tribunal prosecutors to documentary evidence, their
80. See Levi & Hagan, supra note 1, at 6–10.
81. See generally Stéphane Leman-Langlois, Constructing a Common Language: The Function of
Nuremberg in the Problematization of Postapartheid Justice, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 79 (2002).
82. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 484
(2002).
83. See HAGAN, supra note 1, at 60–92; John Hagan & Ron Levi, Crimes of War and the Force of
Law, 83 SOC. FORCES 1499, 1510–14 (2005).
84. See generally Dezalay & Garth, supra note 6.
85. See HAGAN, supra note 1, at 33–59; Levi & Hagan, supra note 1, at 13–15.
86. See Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW
TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS 8–10 (2014)); Andrei Marmor, An
Institutional Conception of Authority, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238 (2011).
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ability to effect arrests, or to interview witnesses remained dependent on states’
87
willingness to extend such cooperation. As the First President of the ICTY
Antonio Cassese emphasized, the Tribunal is “like an armless and legless giant
which needs artificial limbs to act and move. These limbs are the State
authorities . . . . If state authorities fail to carry out their responsibilities, the
88
giant is paralyzed, no matter how determined its efforts.”
In other words, in contrast to the IMT, where prosecutors had the needed
intermediate authority thanks to the readily available documentary evidence—
and focused on building extensive authority—the prosecutorial strategy at the
ICTY needed to build intermediate authority among compliance partners and
thereby collect and develop the evidence required for prosecution. The
Tribunal was supported in doing so by the broad authority it could draw upon
politically and professionally, and from among civil society groups. In what
follows, this article demonstrates how the first three Chief Prosecutors of the
ICTY were central to developing this authority by turning to political and
military partners to obtain detainees, to increase its funding base, to develop
new investigatory powers, and to introduce legal practices in the Balkans that
allowed the continued development of prosecutable cases. Each Chief
Prosecutor did so by building on his or her social and professional background
and resources and sought to change the context in which the ICTY’s authority
was weakest.
The first Chief Prosecutor to enter into this operational context was Justice
Richard Goldstone. A South African judge who had just finished as chair of the
Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation, Goldstone came to the ICTY with a strong understanding of law
and diplomacy, seeing his position as a “big-picture diplomatic role” rather than
89
“hands-on prosecution work,” and endorsing a public role through interviews
90
and travel designed to promote the ICTY’s image. This allowed him to enroll
compliance partners by integrating prosecutorial strategy with efforts to induce
cooperation by external constituencies.
Aware that without indictments he risked UN budget cuts, and conscious of
judicial frustration with the Tribunal’s empty prison, Goldstone
opportunistically relied on the national German police arrest of Duško Tadić to
deliver the Court’s first, if relatively low-level, detainee. Despite uncertainty as
to whether Tadić had been in a leadership position in planning crimes,
91
Goldstone took the position that building compliance was most important.
87. See generally Victor Peskin & Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, International Justice and Domestic
Politics: Post-Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 55
EUROPE–ASIA STUD. 1117 (2003).
88. Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 841, 853
(1997).
89. HAGAN, supra note 1, at 63.
90. Hagan & Levi, supra note 83, at 1510–14.
91. Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International War
Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 876–77 (1997).
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Indeed, when faced the next year with a continued lack of compliance from the
United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO in arresting indictees,
Goldstone proceeded—despite the legalistic reservations of prosecutorial
staff—with in abstentia hearings to pressure international authorities to
apprehend two high-profile indictees, a process that drove Radovan Karadzic
92
out of elected office.
Similarly, when Dražen Erdemović was taken into custody in Belgrade,
Goldstone made a public demand that he appear before the Tribunal. This
demand combined with American political pressure, leading to Erdemović’s
transfer to the ICTY within several weeks. Goldstone also drew on diplomatic
networks to expand the Tribunal’s authority to collect evidence of atrocities,
obtaining Central Intelligence Agency aerial imagery to identify mass graves
sites, and negotiating with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke for
Slobodan Milošević to allow State Department visits to the area around
Srebrenica. These compliance gains opened the door for the Tribunal’s
exhumation work. Indeed, once some victims’ bodies were exhumed, the
Tribunal further claimed search and seizure powers under the Dayton Accords
to collect evidence about the massacre from Bosnian Serb military
93
headquarters.
Yet without individuals in custody, it was difficult for the ICTY to enjoy the
narrow authority it needed for prosecutions. Goldstone was astute at
reconciling this by building the ICTY’s intermediate authority through political
networks that drew on the Tribunal’s existing well of extensive authority. With
a limited set of legal tools at his disposal—and despite legal reservations over
the legitimacy of some tactics—Goldstone expanded the Tribunal’s authority by
opportunistically enrolling networks of national and international authorities,
94
with the ICTY gaining influence over politics and diplomacy. In the process,
Goldstone obtained a sustained annual budget along with compliance partners
outside of the Tribunal. He indicated that “I think I spent more of my time on
diplomacy and pushing and talking and screaming and shouting for the Tribunal
95
than on the simply prosecutorial work.”
The second Chief Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, pursued a similar path in
building the Tribunal’s intermediate authority through compliance partners—
focusing more on the ICTY’s coercive criminal law mandate to increase the
ICTY’s caseload of indictees by working with external enforcement agencies,
gaining state cooperation with the Tribunal, and garnering media interest in the
Tribunal’s work. Arbour brought training in criminal law that opened avenues
for drawing in new compliance partners; perhaps presaging this approach, she
began her tenure by distancing the Tribunal from the human rights
92. Hagan & Levi, supra note 83, at 1513–14.
93. See Schoenfeld, Levi & Hagan, supra note 9, at 16.
94. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1999); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (1999); Hagan & Levi, supra note 85.
95. Hagan & Levi, supra note 83, at 1514.
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organizations that had mobilized to create the Tribunal, to instead building a
96
constituency of criminal lawyers and investigators. If the Tribunal already
enjoyed the sort of extensive authority that civil society would offer, the
prosecution needed to instead focus on gaining custody over defendants and
cooperation from recalcitrant states. The first President of the ICTY, Antonio
Cassese, noted that the main problem of the Court’s authority lay in this
practical level: indicating that this war crimes tribunal “purports to exercise
international criminal jurisdiction,” Cassese stressed that the problem of state
sovereignty remains “when it comes to the day-to-day operations of the
Tribunal,” and that when states do not cooperate with the ICTY “[it] is like lava
97
burning away the foundations of the institution.”
Given the Tribunal’s lack of police powers, Arbour’s first prosecutorial
innovation was to open new opportunities for partnership and authority with
militaries and intelligence agencies by pursuing “sealed” indictments to detach
her prosecutorial strategy from political constraints and resistance of local
authorities. This allowed high-profile arrests to be executed by U.S. and UN
authorities, the British-led Stabilization Force, and later, arrests effected by
Dutch, American, and French-led troops that had previously been shamed by
their lack of compliance. In this way, the prosecutor was able to overcome the
political stonewalling and hesitation that threatened the Tribunal’s relevance.
Indeed, when Arbour later indicted Milošević at the end of her tenure, she
similarly did so with the benefit of secrecy, which allowed her to work with
intelligence agencies across five countries and outside public diplomacy, and to
obtain the largest handover to an outside agency in the history of British
98
intelligence. Following this innovation, Arbour’s prosecutorial team then
defended the approach of third-party arrests by NATO and other forces, an
approach that was later backed by the Appeals Chamber in advancing the
obligation of third parties to conduct arrests and transfer indictees to the Hague
and also in shielding these arrests from claims of illegality. Arbour similarly
took the position that despite the conventional internationalist emphasis on
state sovereignty, some form of subpoena power must reside in the Tribunal. In
response, precisely because it otherwise had no enforcement agents of its own,
the Appeals Chamber fashioned a new tool of a “binding order” for the
99
Tribunal.
Arbour’s second approach in increasing intermediate authority was to gain
greater state cooperation from Balkan states, relying on the extensive political
authority of the ICTY with Western nations to induce cooperation as a
96. See John Hagan, Ron Levi & Gabrielle Ferrales, Swaying the Hand of Justice: The Internal and
External Dynamics of Regime Change at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 585, 593–94 (2006).
97. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 11–12 (1998).
98. John Hagan & Ron Levi, Social Skill, the Milosevic Indictment, and the Rebirth of International
Criminal Justice, 1 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 462 (2004) [hereinafter Social Skill].
99. Levi & Schoenfeld, supra note 9, at 31–34.
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condition of financial assistance. This compelled national leaders to hand over
evidence and indictees to the Tribunal: Croatia thus transferred indictees in
conjunction with its acceptance into the Council of Europe and its receipt of
monetary aid, and Serbia later did so in transferring Milošević and Karadžić to
The Hague following the proffer of U.S. financial incentives.
Finally, in addition to her efforts with militaries, intelligence agencies, and
NATO forces, Arbour’s third prosecutorial innovation was to gain some control
over the public messaging and media image of the Court. She did so by
cultivating partners and networks with the media to generate public support for
the ICTY and its on-site, real-time, and highly emotive investigations. The
extensive media coverage of prosecutor-led exhumations was crucial in
capturing the attention of the world and the attention of UN budget officials,
who had the capacity to increase their monetary support for the ICTY’s
investigatory work. Indeed, as widespread media coverage of the Milošević
indictment and a prosecutorial showdown at the Macedonian border made
clear, media coverage of the Tribunal and its developed ability to capture the
100
attention of the world became one of the key successes of the ICTY.
As Arbour reflected, “I think about Nuremberg every day! The images
101
constantly come to mind.” In this, Arbour expressed her envy of the
Nuremberg prosecutors, where the Court had its defendants in custody, along
with every document necessary. It is precisely to fill this gap in authority that
the first two ICTY prosecutors engaged with a wider range of compliance
partners. This was successful: over the first five years, the ICTY benefited from
a consistent rate of arrested individuals transferred to The Hague, a tripling of
the annual budget, an increase in voluntary contributions from states that
tracked the number of successful arrests, and increased morale among the
102
Tribunal staff sent on missions in the field to conduct investigatory work. In
some sense, as the Tribunal achieved greater intermediate authority, it came to
enjoy greater extensive authority as well.
The third Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, inherited an organization with
a ninety-million-dollar budget, multiple trials underway, and a high level of staff
morale. New state and military cooperation was prompting more arrests, and
more indictees arrived at the Tribunal every month. The challenge for del Ponte
was to secure convictions while also managing political pressure to end
investigations and complete ICTY trials swiftly.
Given this context, del Ponte’s efforts to increase the ICTY’s authority were
no longer as focused on support by militaries and states—other than ensuring
the transfer of Milošević to the Hague through a U.S. donor pledge—but on
building the Tribunal’s legal authority in its prosecutions. To do so, del Ponte
focused on the successful prosecution of complex criminal cases, building on her
previous work in her capacity as Swiss Attorney General, during which she
100. See Social Skill, supra note 98, at 459–61.
101. ERNA PARIS, LONG SHADOWS: TRUTH, LIES AND HISTORY 415 (2001).
102. See HAGAN, supra note 1, at 5.
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investigated bankers, politicians, and organized crime members. She is known
103
for claiming to have “never served anyone or anything but the law.” In the
ICTY she thus went on to develop “monumental” cases, such as that identifying
104
rape as a crime against humanity and the successful prosecution of genocide
charges stemming from the Srebrenica massacre—legal successes that del Ponte
echoed by reorganizing the Office of the Prosecutor to give lawyers greater
control over investigations and to emphasize courtroom successes over new
105
investigations or arrests. When Milošević was indicted for genocide, del Ponte
drew on her experience with Swiss prosecutions of complex financial crimes and
asserted that “instead of pulling and pushing to get detainees, our work has
106
moved more fully into the courtrooms, which is where it belongs.”
Here, del Ponte’s prosecutorial strategy echoed the new legal and
geopolitical context in which the Court found itself: under political pressure
from the United States to wrap up the Tribunal’s efforts rather than issue new
arrests that would prolong the ICTY’s prosecutions. Yet this too necessitated
new compliance partners to build the ICTY’s authority in a changing
geopolitical context, a shifting context that was absent for the shorter-lived
Nuremberg trials. With powerful states fatigued over these prosecutions, and
with concern in the United States over the potential reach of international
criminal law, the ICTY’s “completion strategy” resonated with del Ponte’s
decision to increase the number of trials and to decrease the number of new
investigations. Prosecutions were thus limited to “the most senior leaders
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal” and lower-level cases were transferred to “competent national
107
jurisdictions.”
The ICTY then began the transfer of a significant number of cases to
domestic courts. These courts became the newest compliance partners for the
Tribunal, with transfers legally overseen by the ICTY’s Rule 11bis to refer
108
indictments to another court. Although political constraints have made this
less successful outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there have been beneficial
effects for extending the ICTY’s authority through the War Crimes Section in
the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the transfer of ICTY personnel, the
active influence of ICTY prosecutorial know-how, capacity development,
assistance with human rights expertise, the use in the War Crimes Section of
103. CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH
HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY (2009); Ed Vulliamy, Avenging
Angel, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2001), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/04/warcrimes
.comment.
104. See Askin, supra note 26.
105. Hagan, Levi & Ferrales, supra note 96, at 604.
106. Marlise Simons, Court on Crimes in Former Yugoslavia Hits Its Stride, N.Y. TIMES (May 15,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/international/europe/15hague.html.
107. S.C. Res. 1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
108. See Yuval Shany, How Can International Criminal Courts Have a Greater Impact on National
Criminal Proceedings? Lessons from the First Two Decades of International Criminal Justice in
Operation, 46 ISR. L. REV. 431, 438 (2013).
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evidence from ICTY proceedings, lessons learned from the ICTY regarding the
need for transparency in case selection, and a reliance on ICTY jurisprudence
109
and sentencing practices as persuasive authority.
By expanding the
community of actors drawing on ICTY precedents reinforcing the field as a
whole, the expansion of ICTY authority has had the effect of establishing
greater intermediate and extensive authority for the Tribunal.
Compared to the IMT, the ICTY provides a case study of an international
court that—though enjoying formal delegation from the UN Security Council
and extensive authority politically—required prosecutorial strategies to build its
narrow and intermediate authority by mobilizing external compliance partners.
Whereas the prosecutorial team at Nuremberg had the evidence it needed, the
first three ICTY Chief Prosecutors instead needed to build alliances across
potential compliance partners—diplomats, police forces, and militaries—to
secure state cooperation and to cope with a changing geopolitical context
toward domestic courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They could do so precisely
by leveraging the extensive authority among powerful states that the Court
already enjoyed. The needed compliance partners reflected the political context
in which each of the first three Chief Prosecutors found themselves, and the
social backgrounds they could bring to the ICTY to influence the context itself.
Thus, these prosecutors successfully solidified the ICTY’s narrow and
intermediate authority while gaining ever greater extensive authority for the
Tribunal and the field as a whole.
V
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The latest chapter in international criminal justice is being written at the
ICC, which faces a precarious political and legal position. Its creation was
negotiated at the height of the international human rights community’s
commitment to international prosecution, but it began its operations in a post9/11 environment. It is further embattled by resistance among powerful states as
well as African Union countries threatening to withdraw from the Court as a
backlash to its investigations against sitting heads of state. ICC prosecutors thus
110
find themselves in a unique position regarding Court authority. Perhaps more
so than the ICTY, the ICC enjoys extensive authority among the growing
professional community in international criminal law. Yet because the ICC
deals with ongoing contentious situations—involving states in which multiple
actors are engaged with diverse political options to manage conflicts—and
because the Prosecutor can investigate all offenses on the territory once a
situation is opened, the Court is continually in a weak position. It enjoys less
109. See id. at 443–44; Yaël Ronen, The Impact of the ICTY on Atrocity-Related Prosecutions in the
Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 113, 147–56 (2014).
110. See generally Leslie Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016 (discussing the extent to which international politics have
shaped the extent of the ICC’s authority among state actors).
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narrow authority and less intermediate authority than the ICTY. In addition,
whereas it enjoys deep extensive authority among international legal experts,
this is uneven given the resistance to the Court by powerful states, growing
resistance in states where the Prosecutor is likely to pursue situations, and
vociferous academic debate over the basic goals and utility of the Court.
In some ways, the ICC finds itself only obliquely as the inheritor of a past
111
trajectory of international criminal law and the wider field of global justice.
Compared to the IMT at Nuremberg, the ICC enjoys a professionalized base of
legal scholarship and practitioners on which to draw, but it is faced with
persistent challenges to its narrow and intermediate authority: states
threatening withdrawal from the Court, a range of powerful states that have not
joined the Court, and Security Council referrals that risk not succeeding in
contentious situations.
For most of the past decade the ICC has been known by association with its
first Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo. Ocampo had headed
Transparency International for Latin America, directed a law firm focusing on
corruption, criminal law, and human rights, and prosecuted the generals in the
post-transition Trial of the Juntas in Argentina. Like his predecessors at the
ICTY, Ocampo stated he found the ICC challenging because as Chief
Prosecutor he had to pursue war criminals without the benefits of police and
arrest powers. “I am a stateless prosecutor,” Ocampo lamented. “I have 100
112
states under my jurisdiction and zero policemen.” Indeed, the ICC’s budget,
though the same as that of the ICTY, is spread across investigations in different
countries and situations rather than focused on one geographic region, partly
because the ICC is designed to both defer to and encourage domestic
113
investigations and trials. Yet Ocampo also faced a dilemma in his mandate.
With the ICC limited by its statute to cases in which countries were unwilling or
unable to conduct their own investigations, and is additionally limited, absent a
Security Council referral, to countries that joined as state parties, the ICC’s
docket quickly became focused on African conflicts. This led to deep charges of
114
politicization.
At one level, the resulting crisis of authority lies in the mandate of the
Court, because the situations and often real-time crimes that the ICC is seized
with are deeply enmeshed within ongoing diplomatic, political, and economic
struggles. Its authority is further affected by the fact that the Court must be

111. Cf. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 8 (discussing how courts rely on past cases in their
field).
112. Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes
.com/2006/04/02/magazine/02darfur.html?pagewanted=print.
113. See Alex Whiting, Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3 & 4, 2013, at 163, 175–76.
114. See COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA (Nicholas Waddell &
Phil Clark eds., 2008); Branch, supra note 15, at 179; Mahmood Mamdani, The Politics of Naming:
Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency, 29 LONDON REV. BOOKS, no. 5, Mar. 8, 2007, at 5, http://www.lrb.co
.uk/v29/n05/mahmood-mamdani/the-politics-of-naming-genocide-civil-war-insurgency.
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sufficiently nimble to work with existing cases as well as those that are referred
to it by the Security Council. As Alex Whiting, who earlier served in the ICTY
and then as both Investigation and Prosecution Coordinator with the ICC
notes, in the ICC “each investigation is largely shaped by the constraints and
115
opportunities peculiar to the situation at hand.” Yet this article suggests that
despite the differences presented by each situation, ICC prosecutors have also
adopted strategies designed to reflect the Court’s possible sources of authority.
The focus of the Office of the Prosecutor has thus been on distancing itself from
any charges of politicization by changing the way in which evidence is gathered
and presented.
For the ICC Prosecutor, the need to deflect charges of politicization—
which, by contrast, were less prevalent in the geopolitical context of the ICTY
due to the breadth of political support for the Tribunal—has led to a strategy
focused on legal analysis and procedure decoupled from investigations. This is
partly explained by the budgetary constraints of the Court, including the cost of
116
witness testimony, the risks of testimony being undermined or withdrawn, and
117
the bureaucratic structure of the Prosecutor’s office. It is also the case that the
ongoing context of conflict makes it a challenge for the ICC Prosecutor to
118
This is further
gauge the strength of eventual testimony in Court.
underwritten by security concerns present on the ground during ongoing
119
conflicts, so that the capacity for the Prosecutor to investigate depends on
support from interested parties.
Echoing Justice Jackson’s strategy at Nuremberg, Ocampo observed that
“[o]ur goal is to go even further,” in particular, to prosecute “a case with no
120
witnesses, no victims.” And indeed the ICC has gone on to invest heavily in
the formal legal “in-house” development of its cases, pursuing a strategy relying
on social science and documentary methods—even if to-date witnesses remain
121
the core of the prosecutions. And given that the ICC’s strongest base of
authority lies in the professional and academic legal community, it is not
surprising that the Office of the Prosecutor has sought to play to this strength

115. Whiting, supra note 113, at 163.
116. See Thomas Escritt, War Crimes Court Frustrated by Reliance on Witnesses, REUTERS (Sept.
20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-kenya-icc-investigations-idUSBRE98J0HY
20130920.
117. Philipp Ambach & Klaus U. Rackwitz, A Model of International Judicial Administration? The
Evolution of Managerial Practices at the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
nos. 3 & 4, 2013, at 119.
118. Whiting, supra note 113, at 185.
119. See WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND
TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 55–60 (Oct.
2012) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT], http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/
documents/ICCReport16.pdf.
120. College’s Center on Law and Globalization Hosts Hague Colloquium Addressing Sexual
Violence and Genocide, UNIV. OF ILL. COLL. OF LAW (June 22, 2009), http://www.law.illinois.edu/
news/article/1061.
121. See Whiting, supra note 113, at 181.
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122

by investing in “pure law” and by seeking to distance investigatory partners so
as to control the collection of witness testimony and avoid charges of
politicization. Thus a continued strategy to resonate with and shore up support
among the Prosecutor’s most significant professional constituencies is apparent.
In the ICC, this prosecutorial strategy has been implemented in two main
ways. First, at a bureaucratic level, the ICC Prosecutor reorganized the Office
123
of the Prosecutor around a more purely legal orientation. Likely as an
outgrowth of the legal professionalization of the field of international criminal
law, the staff of the Office came with a legal and specialized training in
international criminal law. By 2009, prosecutions were largely overseen from
within the Office of the Prosecutor in The Hague and by a staff with a legal
background or experience in human rights organizations, rather than a training
in police investigation focused, by contrast, more on chain of custody and
avoidance of hearsay in the collection of victim statements. The ICC
Prosecutor saw himself as developing a strategy involving cases against top
figures and as centering on the narrower legal issue of establishing the
responsibility for command authority over crimes rather than proving the
occurrence of the crimes themselves. As others have pointed out, this decision
to avoid on-the-ground field investigations from within the Office of the
Prosecutor has been fundamentally strategic on the part of the Prosecutor, and
124
it “seems to have been a point of pride for the Office.” The Court’s limited
authority is also reflected by pressures on its budget, and its hesitation to
125
request additional budgetary resources from the Assembly of States Parties.
Conducting investigations has, as one journalist suggests, become “but the poor
126
cousin of the international politics of the [ICC].”
The result of this strategy is that the Prosecutor has relied heavily on
developing evidence for the prosecutions by relying on external NGOs already
working in the politically charged contexts of the ICC’s investigations. In the
place of ICC-led investigators, the Court came to rely heavily on NGOs already
pre-positioned in Africa when conducting their investigations. This has been
harshly criticized by the ICC judges, who in the Court’s first prosecution
expressed concern with “the use by the prosecution of local intermediaries in
the DRC,” and indicated that the prosecution “should not have delegated its
127
investigative responsibilities to intermediaries.” In the same vein, the Court in

122. Yves Dezalay, From Mediation to Pure Law: Practice and Scholarly Representation within the
Legal Sphere, 14 INT’L J. SOC. L. 89, 89 (1986).
123. Whiting, supra note 113, at 173–88.
124. INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 119, at 32.
125. See id.
126. Stéphanie Maupas, CPI: enquêteurs passifs et sans moyens pour procédures bâclées, LE
MONDE (June 8, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/07/02/cpi-enqueteurs-passifs-et-sansmoyens-pour-procedures-baclees_3440543_3214.html (“L'enquête est le parent pauvre de la politique
pénale de la Cour.”).
127. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2843, Summary of the Judgment, ¶ 17
(Mar. 14, 2012).
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Lubanga quoted William Pace, the founding convener of the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court, stating that “human rights and humanitarian
128
organizations are lousy criminal investigators.” It therefore focused the
greatest bulk of its decision on these questions of investigation and evidence,
and it stressed the gap between “the information provided by human rights
groups . . . eager to call international attention to crises and “forensic evidence
129
that can be used by a prosecutor.” This prosecutorial strategy was again
criticized in the case against former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo,
with the Court expressing its concern over hearsay received from NGO
130
reports.
The second major approach of the Prosecution to emphasize “pure law” is
evident in its case development strategy, which focuses on selecting a small
number of cases that can have legal impact quickly, rather than undergoing a
lengthy process of pursuing all potential leads. This is partly explained, again,
by the lack of investigatory staffing. It was also a response to the Prosecutor’s
desire to move swiftly, in the face of political pressure and an empty docket
until the arrest of its first indictee in 2006. Bernard Lavigne, who led an early
investigatory team in Lubanga and was called to testify on the question of
evidence, noted what he referred to as the “pressure [of] public opinion
131
internationally,” which would have included, at the time, fierce U.S. resistance
to the Court’s operations.
Lawyers representing victims have thus taken the Prosecutor to task for
only prosecuting Lubanga for the crime of enrolling children as soldiers, rather
than for crimes related to children’s treatment and sexual exploitation. This is
tied to the lack of prosecutorial attention that is placed within the Office of the
Prosecutor on investigations, including the small teams that are deployed and
132
the comparatively short time frame of which they can avail themselves. Yet
here too the emphasis has been on producing the ICC’s authority by drawing on
a limited number of compelling legal cases to launch the Court. As one former
investigator said,
We knew that during killings, rapes happened [but] the idea was that the first ICC trial
could not fail. To organize a good trial, the prosecutor selected child soldiers as the
only charge against133Lubanga and [decided] to drop the others . . . against the will of
many investigators.

128. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment, ¶ 130 (Mar. 14, 2012).
129. Id.
130. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute (June 3, 2013); see
also Blake Evans-Pritchard & Simon Jennings, ICC to Unveil New Investigation Strategy, REPORTING
KENYA (Oct. 22, 2013), http://reportingkenya.net/reports/icc-to-unveil-new-investigation-strategy/.
131. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Deposition of Bernard Lavigne, 21
(2010).
132. See INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 119, at 48.
133. Katy Glassborow, ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE
REPORTING (Oct. 27, 2008), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-investigative-strategy-under-fire.
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Throughout the Court’s work, then, the focus of the ICC Prosecutor has been
on narrowing the scope of investigations, selecting a small number of incidents,
and developing cases likely to draw public attention to leading figures rather
than prosecuting atrocities more broadly. As a senior ICC prosecutor stated in
an interview:
We have always followed a policy where we do not want to have ICTY type of
investigations where we charge basically the history of the Balkans in one case so that
is an attempt to write history in criminal proceedings . . . . So what we do is we focus
our investigations on a very limited number of crimes, we also focus our investigations
on those persons whom we believe bear the greatest responsibility . . . . We are also
134
very selective in how many witnesses we bring.

The prosecutorial strategy of the ICC is not only different, then, from the
ICTY—it is most akin to that of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg. The desire to
bring a comparatively small number of cases, to highlight leadership figures
rather than to prosecute a full scope of atrocities, and to avoid broad witness
testimony echoes the evidentiary and prosecutorial strategy of Nuremberg.
Although occurring in fundamentally different geopolitical contexts—the IMT
at Nuremberg enjoyed access to all documents and defendants and was
supported with narrow and intermediate authority, whereas the ICC is in the
reverse situation of enjoying extensive authority among a community of
practice but has neither narrow nor intermediate authority at its disposal—the
two courts have reacted to their authority constraints in fundamentally similar
ways at the level of prosecutorial strategy.
VI
CONCLUSION
In many international courts, authority turns on judicial decisions. Yet in the
context of international criminal courts, prosecutorial strategy is often at the
core of the building or waning of authority. This is partly because of the power
of prosecutors to make headlines with indictments, and it is partly because of
the highly contentious and atypical political environments in which these courts
operate. If these political environments are atypical, this article’s survey of the
prosecutorial strategy developed by these courts suggests that in building their
authority, prosecutors are acutely aware of the authority they enjoy and thus
seek to speak to the constituencies they need—while avoiding others—through
their prosecutorial practices.
This article provides insight into the varying forms of de facto authority that
international criminal courts enjoy, and in light of which prosecutors develop
practices that reflect and seek to adapt to the external contexts in which they
operate. Further, this article demonstrates that the IMT at Nuremberg, which
enjoyed narrow and intermediate authority—with full access to documents and
evidence, but also with skepticism in some quarters over its legalistic mandate—
sits in stark contrast to the ICTY and the ICC, and their needs for evidence,
134. Anonymous interview conducted by author.
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defendants, and state cooperation.
Different prosecutorial practices thus emerge. Justice Jackson at
Nuremberg, by having all available evidence at his disposal, spoke mainly to a
professional community in the specific domestic context of the United States
rather than draw in the media or others through victim testimony. This article
suggests that this internal and external contestation, the unevenness of
authority of the IMT at Nuremberg, and the geopolitical centrality of the
United States in the post–World War II moment, underwrote the prosecutorial
motivation to rely on an evidentiary strategy highlighting documents
throughout the trial. ICTY prosecutors, by contrast, drew on the extensive
authority they enjoyed to build a range of compliance partners for the
Tribunal—at first focusing on building investigatory and media networks for the
prosecutors, and then seeking out compliance partners in domestic courts as the
Tribunal’s extensive authority was in danger of waning. And in the ICC, whose
authority is mainly limited to the community of international law practitioners
and NGOs directly supporting the ICC and seeking to deflect charges of
politicization, the prosecutorial strategy has aimed at distancing itself from
investigation and the murky contexts of ongoing conflicts, instead limiting its
reach to a narrow set of legal issues and cases.
In the context of international criminal courts, the analysis of authority and
prosecutorial practice is tied to the question of how to speak authoritatively
about atrocity. In contrast to teleological accounts of international criminal law
that presume this authority grows with time, this article suggests that the narrow
and intermediate aspects of international criminal court authority have waned
over time. In light of this, prosecutors have scrambled to build the authority
they need. As a result, the ICTY had sufficient extensive authority from which
the Tribunal could draw by tightly coupling its links with compliance partners to
overcome weaker narrow and intermediate authority. Yet in the ICC, the risks
of being identified as politicized, combined with the mandate constraints in
which the Court operates, has led the Office of the Prosecutor to distance itself
from compliance partners, a loose coupling that has led to skepticism from
judges and victims alike. Perhaps mirroring these courts’ loss of authority
externally, the result has been that, though prosecutors have matched their
strategies to the available forms of authority they could marshal, the field of
international criminal law has—if anything—lost more authority than it has
gained.

